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In recent years, the relationship between international human rights law and 
the environment has seen a rapid evolution.  The high visibility of transnational 
and global environmental challenges, and the severe impacts they impose upon 
vulnerable groups—including women, children, and indigenous people—has led 
activists to bring both human rights and environmental law to bear on problems 
ranging from climate change to soil and water pollution from mineral exploration 
activities, as well as other contemporary environmental issues.  Matters are being 
heard before domestic courts and international human rights bodies, such as the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights.  
In a series of resolutions, the U.N. Human Rights Council has drawn attention 
to this interrelationship, and in 2008, it appointed an independent expert on the 
human right to water—a right that was explicitly recognized by the U.N. General 
Assembly two years later.1  In 2012, the U.N. Human Rights Council appointed 
John Knox, a U.S. law professor, as an Independent Expert on Human Rights and 
the Environment.2  These developments have raised awareness of how 
fundamental the environment is as a prerequisite to the enjoyment of human 
rights.  
For Santa Clara University School of Law, developments in the fields of human 
rights law and environmental law are of especially great interest.  Santa Clara 
Law’s International Human Rights Clinic has been working on international 
human rights litigation and advocacy projects, including those that link to 
environmental quality, while providing a unique educational opportunity for 
students to gain practical experience at the intersection of the two fields.  
Moreover, Professor Dinah Shelton, the preeminent scholarly voice on human 
rights and the environment and former member and chair of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, served on the faculty of Santa Clara Law while 
conducting some of her early seminal work on these issues.  
It is in this context that on January 24-25, 2014, the Santa Clara University 
Center for Global Law and Policy and the Santa Clara Journal of International 
Law co-hosted a symposium on the “Environment and Human Rights.”  The 
symposium included a keynote address by Professor Dinah Shelton; four main 
papers by Professors Rebecca Bratspies, Maxine Burkett, Carmen Gonzalez, and 
Rebecca Tsosie, and commentaries on these papers by a distinguished group of 
 
1. G.A. Res. 64/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/64/292 (July 28, 2010), available at http://www.un.org/ 
es/comun/docs/ ?symbol=A/RES/64/292&lang=E.  
2. John Knox, Independent Expert on human rights and the environment, OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Environment/IEEnvironment/Pages/ 
JohnKnox.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2014).  
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leading scholars and practitioners dedicated to human rights and the environment.  
The event was co-sponsored by Santa Clara University’s Markkula Center for 
Applied Ethics and the American Society of International Law.   
This Symposium issue of the Journal presents an insightful and thought-
provoking collection of articles exploring and addressing the interrelationship 
between human rights and the environment.  Professor Shelton and Professor 
Bratspies’ articles focus directly on the intersection of human rights and the 
environment, examining its development and analyzing current understandings.  
Articles by Professor Burkett, Professor Gonzalez, and Professor Tsosie inquire 
into specific topics that are profoundly affected by human rights and 
environmental law analysis, such as climate change compensation, the 
relationship between industrialized nations and the developing world, and 
restorative justice for radioactive contamination of the lands of indigenous people.  
This collection of articles directly advances a better understanding of current 
issues and develops solutions based on masterful insights from leading thinkers at 
the cutting edge of the field.    
Professor Shelton’s essay, Whiplash and Backlash—Reflections on a Human 
Rights Approach to Environmental Protection, is both a reflection on the evolution 
of the field and an assessment of its present state and future direction.  Presented 
as the keynote speech for the symposium, the essay provides both provocative 
insight into the views of the leading scholar on the jurisprudential evolution of the 
human rights and the environment linkage, and the personal observations of an 
individual directly engaged in the field’s most pressing issues.  Professor Shelton’s 
historical perspective on the role of human rights issues in the origins of modern 
international environmental law gives readers crucial context for present day 
prospects. She informs us that while a human rights perspective on environmental 
problems evolved rapidly, especially through the incorporation of a right to a 
healthy environment into American state and foreign national constitutions, 
jurisprudential development slowed significantly due to political backlash, arising 
in significant part out of perceived conflicts of such concerns with economic 
development priorities of nations.3  Currently, evolution of a rights-based approach 
to the environment is continuing, but at a more measured pace.  However, both 
environmental and human rights jurisprudence benefit from a better 
understanding of the interrelationship between environmental quality and human 
wellbeing.  Professor Shelton concludes that the two fields not only overlap in their 
substantive concerns, but are in fact jurisprudentially interconnected and linked, 
 
3. See Dinah Shelton, Whiplash and Backlash—Reflections on a Human Rights Approach to 
Environmental Protection, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 11, 16-21 (2015). 
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each informing and providing form and content for the other.4 
Professor Bratspies’ contribution, Do We Need A Human Right to a Healthy 
Environment?, explores the theoretical underpinnings of this topic.  Specifically, 
her article explores why human rights norms and analyses are increasingly 
invoked in the environmental policy context, and finds reasons in the 
“unconditional normative value and immediate applicability”5 of human rights 
norms as well as their “timelessness, absoluteness, and universal validity.”6  Yet, 
the article reminds us that the lure of human rights discourse finds limitations in 
the substance of domestic and international environmental law.  Efforts to use 
human rights norms to achieve environmental objectives encounter similar 
opportunities and challenges.  Professor Bratspies posits that two premises are key 
to understanding the relationship between the fields: (1) environmental quality is a 
precondition to the fulfillment of human rights; and (2) human rights norms can be 
an important tool for improving and protecting the environment.7  However, she 
concludes that this approach is limited in its effectiveness since some 
environmental concerns do not even involve humans8 and the approach is 
“inherently fragmented and episodic.”9  Accordingly, she argues that a new 
approach “that recognizes the right to a safe and healthy environment as an 
independent substantive human right”10 is both called for and is in fact emerging.   
Finally, Professor Bratspies identifies private actors, such as transnational 
corporations, as raising important concerns in this context.  Her article identifies 
the nature of corporations as creations of the state, pointing to the authority of 
states to extend human rights obligations to such non-state actors, and creating a 
path for holding them accountable in the international legal framework.11  She 
concludes that the human right to a healthy environment approach is already 
making impacts in “legal, constitutional, and political cultures of many states, and 
of international institutions.”12 
In his commentary on Professor Bratspies’ article, Dr. Marcos Orellana offers 
the perspective of a leading practitioner in international human rights and 
environmental law.  He notes that Professor Bratspies’ article identifies one of the 
fundamental tensions between the two fields: that human rights law establishes 
 
4. Id. at 27-28.  
5. Rebecca Bratspies, Do We Need A Human Right to a Healthy Environment?, 13 SANTA CLARA J. 
INT’L L. 31, 41 (2015). 
6. Id. at 42. 
7. Id. at 50-55. 
8. Id. at 55. 
9. Id. at 57. 
10. Id. 
11. Bratspies, supra note 5, at 61-65. 
12. Id. at 67. 
 Symposium Introduction 
5 
limits “on state sovereignty by affirming the international community’s interest in 
their promotion and effective enjoyment,” while “environmental policy is premised 
on the sovereign rights of states.”13  This and other differences impose significant 
limitations on existing approaches to human rights and the environment, making 
a free-standing right to a healthy environment a necessity.  He also calls for 
answers to questions about the fundamental content of such a right, as well as for 
more effective implementation of the environmental dimension of existing human 
rights.  Dr. Orellana believes that the synthesis of the two fields will eventually 
give rise to a “rights-based approach to environmental policy” that can serve as a 
valuable tool for overcoming “the global politicization of the environment.”14  His 
commentary advises that even though progress of the field continues, including 
through calls for recognition of the right to a healthy environment at the recent 
Rio+20 conference, meeting outcomes have failed to establish a framework for a 
rights-based approach to sustainable development—the ultimate prize for a 
synthesis of the two fields.15  Nevertheless, Dr. Orellana advises that further 
progress in human rights and the environment will be likely, given the support of 
various countries and in light of the field’s ultimate value for achieving sustainable 
development.16 
Professor Burkett’s paper, Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate 
Compensation Mechanism for Small Island States, examines the proposal for a 
Small Islands Compensation and Rehabilitation Commission (CRC).17  
Championed by the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) to address the special 
adverse impacts of climate change on small island developing states, the CRC has 
been proposed as a multi-pronged insurance mechanism to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC).  Its structure would consist 
of: (1) an insurance component that would “manage financial risk from 
increasingly frequent and severe extreme weather events in a timely manner;”18 
(2) a rehabilitation and compensation component that “would address ‘progressive 
negative impacts of climate change;’”19 and (3) a risk management component that 
“would facilitate and inform the prior two components by supporting and 
 
13. Marcos Orellana, Reflections on the Right to a Healthy Environment: Comments On Rebecca 
Bratspies' Do We Need A Human Right To A Healthy Environment?, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 
71, 72 (2015). 
14. Id. at 73-74.  
15. Id. at 76-77. 
16. Id. at 77-78. 
17. See Maxine Burkett, Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate Compensation Mechanism for Small 
Island States, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 81 (2015). 
18. Id. at 94. 
19. Id.  
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promoting risk assessment and management tools.”20   Professor Burkett’s paper 
carefully examines the proposal, which was originally based on a life-insurance 
model, but ultimately concludes that an insurance-based approach may not be 
workable.21  Instead, she submits that the mechanism will need to resemble a 
compensation mechanism, much like the one found in the United Nations 
Compensation Commission (UNCC), a commission set up to address the claims 
against Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait and the resulting environmental damage.22  
The CRC would ideally rely on the experiences and lessons learned from the 
UNCC as a guide for the establishment of such a new institution.  Professor 
Burkett’s article closes with a discussion of guiding principles, questions of how 
substantive compensation decisions would be made, and potential structural 
arrangements for the mechanism.23 
Both Professor Randall Abate’s and Dr. Damilola Olawuyi’s responses agree 
with Professor Burkett’s CRC as a valuable conceptual tool for achieving climate 
justice; however, the commentators contend that such a proposal would encounter 
significant implementation difficulties.  Professor Abate’s commentary approaches 
the topic by raising issues such as (1) which nations should be able to take 
advantage of the compensation mechanism,  (2) how should damages be quantified 
for compensation purposes, and (3) how should the practical difficulties of ensuring 
funding and political support for a new international institution be overcome.24  
Dr. Olawuyi’s commentary engages the challenges of establishing and 
administering the CRC through a set of four similar questions: (1) would the 
current set of professionals and organizations involved in climate change policy 
have the capacity to implement a compensation mechanism; (2) how should one 
manage or limit the number of claimants to the fund, so as not to overwhelm 
available resources; (3) what is its relationship with existing climate change 
institutions such as the Kyoto compliance mechanism; and (4) how can one ensure 
the integrity and accountability of the claims process.25  In the end, the two 
respondents arrive at differing conclusions about the practicality of a compensation 
mechanism.  Professor Abate believes that the UNCC is not likely to work as a 
model for designing a climate change compensation mechanism, and suggests 
instead, that funding for small island nations be directly channeled to adaptation 
 
20. Id.  
21. Id. at 96-98. 
22. Id. at 99-103. 
23. Burkett, supra note 17, at 106-24. 
24. See Randall S. Abate, Comment on Maxine Burkett’s Rehabilitation: A Proposal for a Climate 
Compensation Mechanism for Small Island States, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 125 (2015).  
25. See Damilola S. Olawuyi, Proposal for a Climate Compensation Mechanism for Small Island 
States: Response to Maxine Burkett, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 133 (2015). 
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and relocation efforts.26  Dr. Olawuyi also acknowledges great challenges to 
making the compensation mechanism a reality, but concludes that its strategic 
importance should prompt a fine-tuning of the approach to address the practical 
implementation challenges presented.27 
The third article in this collection, Professor Gonzalez’s Environment Justice, 
Human Rights, and the Global South, presents the historical and economic context 
of environmental injustice between nations and articulates the limitations of 
human rights discourse for providing a satisfactory solution. Explaining the 
colonial roots of current economic and environmental injustice, Professor Gonzalez 
argues that traditional international law discourse has been used both to justify 
colonial relationships in the past, as well as to continue unequal economic 
relationships, especially the international dominance by industrialized nations, 
into the present.28  Even though human rights jurisprudence holds significant 
potential for advancing environmental objectives and vice versa, she contends that 
human rights law contains significant limitations for achieving environmental 
justice.29  In her exploration of these issues, Professor Gonzalez expands on some of 
the points raised by Professor Bratspies, but also notes, for example, how the 
existing human rights discourse has failed to address historic injustices and 
economic inequity or reign in the role of transnational corporations in human 
rights abuses.30  Instead of accepting these problems as deficiencies that render the 
combination of environment and human rights ineffective, she suggests accepting 
the utility of the human rights framework for environmental analysis, adding that 
local visions of human dignity can inform the right to a healthy environment and 
help overcome such limitations.31  Ultimately, Professor Gonzalez concludes that 
“human rights law and institutions are embedded in power relations that replicate 
colonial discourses,”32 but they also possess “tremendous emancipatory potential . . 
. to advocate for a more equitable and sustainable society.”33  
Professor Sumudu Atapattu’s commentary on Professor Gonzalez’s article 
echoes the scholar’s key assertions.  However, she highlights additional issues that 
could have been raised by the article, especially whether the critique of human 
rights discourse applies uniformly to all forms of human rights norms despite their 
 
26. Abate, supra note 24, at 130. 
27. Olawuyi, supra note 25, at 147-49. 
28. See Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environment Justice, Human Rights and the Global South, 13 SANTA 
CLARA J. INT’L L. 151 (2015). 
29. Id. at 172-73.  
30. Id. at 172-83.  
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 194. 
33. Id. 
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multifaceted nature, ranging from the procedural to the substantive.34  Other 
issues that Professor Atapattu raises include the growing relevance of matters 
such as the Ruggie Principles and the rights of nature.35   
With Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation: Redressing the Legacy 
of Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands, Professor 
Tsosie explores the ramifications of achieving reparative justice for native peoples 
seeking redress for environmental harms to themselves and their lands.  Her 
paper focuses on the legacy of radioactive contamination associated with uranium 
mining affecting the Navajo Nation and parallels in the experiences of indigenous 
people on the Marshall Islands with the consequences of nuclear weapons 
testing.36  Professor Tsosie’s comparative examination of these two native 
experiences examines not only the limitations of available legal tools to the Navajo 
Nation, but also shows the significant disparity in ultimate outcomes.  Even 
though both native peoples have had analogous trust relationships with the United 
States government, the people of the Marshall Islands were ultimately able to 
obtain a far more generous and appropriate reparations package than what was 
provided to the Navajo Nation.37 Her comparative analysis reveals important 
parallels of attaining individualized justice in such situations. 
Based on the deficiencies of contemporary legal remedies, the special status of 
native peoples, and their unique trust relationship with the federal government, 
Professor Tsosie develops a framework for reparative justice due to indigenous 
people that seeks to capture both material compensation needs as well as the 
“intangible, psychological” component of grave injustices.38  This framework, 
“ethics of remediation,” looks not only to the past as relevant, but also to the 
present and future, and the attendant moral relationship between the parties.39  In 
other words, she argues that an ethics of remediation requires not only the redress 
of physical harms, but also the repair of moral, spiritual, and dignitary injuries, as 
well as acknowledgment of the interconnection of the past to the present and 
future.  Looking to the remediation efforts in the South Pacific suggests an 
intercultural component for the Navajo, meaning that “an ethics of remediation 
should be based on a platform of mutual respect, honoring Indigenous self-
 
34. See Sumudu Atapattu, Comments on Environmental Justice, Human Rights, and the Global 
South by Professor Carmen Gonzalez, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 197 (2015). 
35. Id. at 201.  
36. See Rebecca Tsosie, Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation: Redressing the Legacy of 
Radioactive Contamination for Native Peoples and Native Lands, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 191 
(2015). 
37. Id. at 232-34.  
38. Id. at 235. 
39. Id. at 267-70. 
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determination and the protective aspects of the federal trust responsibility.”40  
Professor Kronk Warner’s essay Working to Protect the Seventh Generation:  
Indigenous Peoples as Agents of Change builds on and extends Professor Tsosie’s 
ethics of remediation framework to climate change issues.  Through Professor 
Kronk Warner’s exploration, indigenous people can play a special role in 
implementing climate solutions through their special sovereign status, connection 
to the environment, and distinct experiences.  She proposes that these special 
characteristics can allow indigenous peoples to serve as agents of change with a 
unique view on environmental issues from a human rights perspective.41  Professor 
Kronk Warner also asserts that the indigenous people’s role in human rights and 
the environment can showcase that restorative justice requires legal as well as 
moral redress that tells their stories for the achievement of justice.42 
Professor Robert Coulter’s The Situation of the Indigenous People of Rapa Nui 
and International Law: Reflections on Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of 
Remediation applies Professor Tsosie’s ideas to the people of Rapa Nui, a small 
island west of Chile.  Their difficulties have included not only lack of self-
determination and rapid immigration from Chile, but also disintegration of their 
access to sacred and protected sites.43  Professor Coulter suggests that 
environmental protection concerns can be used as a tool for achieving an ethics of 
remediation in international human rights law, including in the struggles of the 
people of Rapa Nui for self-determination and redressing of wrongs.44 
Overall, the Symposium articles illustrate the broad range of issues found at the 
intersection of human rights and the environment.  The expert scholarship 
challenges us to be ambitious and engage in further inquiry and research.  Policy-
makers, activists, and scholars will have to work hard to integrate the legal 
frameworks, core values, and objectives of environmental law and international 
human rights law effectively.  Although the appropriate relationship and role of 
politics vis-à-vis legal principles remains to be identified, institutions in both fields 
must become more effective in implementing existing law.  The potential 
contribution toward advancing human rights and environmental quality could be 
great.  
 
40. Id. at 270. 
41. See Elizabeth Ann Kronk Warner, Working to Protect the Seventh Generation: Indigenous Peoples 
as Agents of Change, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 257 (2015). 
42. Id. at 287-91.  
43. See Robert T. Coulter, The Situation of the Indigenous People of Rapa Nui and International Law: 
Reflections on Indigenous Peoples and the Ethics of Remediation, 13 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 293, 
295-97 (2015).  
44. Id. at 302.  

